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# **TRENDS**

in Communist Propaganda

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U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS  
In an unusual assessment in bloc media,  
of the "political atmosphere in Moscow,"  
Korshenny also reported a new sense of calm prevailing there: "the  
tone of political discussions has changed in Moscow since the spring."  
He found a belief among Soviet "American experts" that the U.S.  
interest in arms limitations is serious and of a long-term nature.  
"The U.S. inclination to negotiate and come to terms is not  
merely a current policy but a political trend developed on  
the basis of realities in Washington," Korshenny said. He  
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## CHILE - USSR

### COMMUNIQUE ON ALLENDE VISIT IMPLIES LIMITED SOVIET COMMITMENT

The relatively bland communique issued at the conclusion of Chilean President Salvador Allende's 6-9 December visit to the Soviet Union was notable for its failure to indicate any major new Soviet political or economic commitment to Chile. Moscow's expression of "understanding"—but not support—of Allende's efforts to "carry out social and economic reforms, strengthen the country's economy, its national sovereignty and independence, and build socialism" was noteworthy for the recognition of a Chilean effort to build socialism but was weaker than formulations used following previous visits of Chilean leaders to Moscow. For example, the statement issued last June following the talks in Moscow between Chilean Socialist Party Secretary General Carlos Altamirano and Brezhnev and other ranking Soviet officials said the Soviet leaders "expressed complete support for the revolutionary changes" effected by the Allende government.

The communique failed to characterize the tone of Allende's talks with Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, although routine-level reports on the progress of the talks in Moscow media had said they took place "in an atmosphere of friendship and a complete identity of views and positions on all questions discussed." Moscow's evident caution in embracing the Allende regime would appear to stem from wariness about undertaking the kind of costly, open-ended commitment the USSR has made to Cuba as well as from a reluctance to become too closely associated with a regime whose stability has been brought into question by recurring domestic political and economic crises over the past year.

### VAGUE ECONOMIC PROMISES

The communique noted that the USSR "has been giving and is prepared to give further political and economic support" to Chile and that both sides expressed a desire "to further deepen relations of friendship and improve mutually beneficial cooperation." But in outlining the "concrete measures" envisaged to implement these aims, it made no mention of the hard currency credits urgently needed by the Chileans.

\* Moscow has heretofore scrupulously avoided referring to "building socialism" in connection with Chile. Typically, a 9 December Moscow radio talk on Allende's visit referred merely to Chilean workers embarking on "the construction of a new life" and to the Chilean people's "struggle for independence and progress."

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Instead, it referred to the kinds of long-term aid for capital construction projects that Moscow has already been providing.

The failure of the communique to mention any new Soviet hard currency credits is particularly noteworthy in light of the extension of such credits to Chile early this year. Moscow has given only negligible publicity to this credit, probably out of a desire to discourage further requests from Chile and to avoid inviting similar requests from other currency-poor developing nations. A November Radio Moscow commentary on Soviet-Chilean cooperation, however, did acknowledge that the Soviet Union had granted Chile "a credit of nearly 100 million dollars for the purchase of foodstuffs."

Reported statements by Chilean officials have been vague on the results of the Moscow talks. AFP on the 8th reported a member of Allende's official party in Moscow as stating that the USSR had agreed to provide Chile with increased economic aid, but the report gave no details. And an AFP dispatch from Paris on the 9th reported the President of the Chilean Central Bank, Alfonso Inostrosa, as having denied a report that Allende sold 130,000 tons of copper to the USSR while in Moscow and as having stressed that Chile was interested in selling copper "in the traditional markets, especially Europe." Inostrosa was reported to have said that expansion of "certain exports" to the USSR and Soviet involvement in Chilean economic development could help "to create an infrastructure for exploiting our petroleum and coal."

Reports on 12 December from PLENSA LATINA's Santiago correspondent to his Havana office and by the LATIN news agency quoted Chilean opposition spokesman as being highly critical of Soviet credit offers to Allende. Allende's opponents reportedly declared that the USSR is not helping Chile to solve its acute foreign exchange shortage by providing hard currency needed for the purchase of food and spare parts; a leading Christian Democratic legislator was quoted as having observed disparagingly that "money is being loaned only for machinery sold to us by the USSR."

**INTERNATIONAL ISSUES** For the most part, the sections of the joint communique on international issues followed a predictable pattern: The document condemned the U.S. "blockade" of Cuba, applauded recent moves toward detente in Europe, supported the DRV and the PRG, and endorsed a world disarmament conference.

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One area where the communique conspicuously sought to blur Soviet-Chilean differences was on the rights of states to set limits on their territorial waters, which Chile actively supports--maintaining a 200-mile territorial sea limit--and the USSR opposes.<sup>4</sup> The communique, hinting at the continuing divergence of views, stated that "the two sides exchanged opinions concerning the forthcoming UN conference on Maritime Law and expressed readiness to concert their positions and cooperate with each other in achieving the aims of the conference, with due account taken of the interests of all states."

The communique predictably condemned "foreign interference" in Chilean internal affairs without specifying that either the U.S. Government or U.S. companies were the culprits. In a veiled reference to the Kennecott Copper Company's recent attempt to embargo Chilean copper shipments to Western Europe, it denounced "Foreign monopolies" for trying to deprive Chile of its right to use its natural resources as it sees fit, "specifically the right to sell its copper freely."

**ALLENDE'S STATEMENTS** Allende's remarks in Moscow conveyed strong hints to his Soviet hosts that Chile should be considered as deserving of Soviet generosity as is Vietnam. Speaking at a 6 December Kremlin dinner in his honor, the Chilean leader effusively lauded Soviet aid to Vietnam and went on to cite the description of Chile by Pablo Neruda, Chilean Nobel Prize winning poet and communist Party luminary, as "a silent Vietnam"--a country which, while not experiencing "the roar of aircraft and grenade explosions," shared the same feeling of an "overt and concealed encirclement of our country."

Allende touched briefly on Chile's current difficulties, noting in the dinner speech that Chile was "implementing a revolutionary process...within the framework of a bourgeois democracy, and it is

<sup>4</sup> Since 1970 the Chinese have supported those Latin American states claiming 200-mile territorial sea limit and have used the issue in polemics against Moscow, lambasting "superpower" efforts to deprive smaller countries of their ocean resources. Moscow has avoided publicizing the issue. Soviet media did not carry remarks by USSR delegate Kosygin in the UNCA Political Committee on 8 November in which he cited as one of the USSR's objections to the Treaty on a Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone the fact that it permits states to set their own territorial sea limits.

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not easy," Hora said in other statements, he stressed that Chile was the victim of economic "aggression" by "imperialist monopolies." In an interview on Moscow Radio and TV, Allende took note of alleged efforts by the PRR to prevent him from taking power and later to overthrow him.

## THAILAND

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"We are the victim of economic "aggression" by "imperialist monopolies."

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### THAI CP ANNIVERSARY: THAI STRESS, CHINESE MUTE ARMED STRUGGLE

Observances of the Thai Communist Party's 30th anniversary on December have reflected both persisting elements and new directions in Southeast Asia, most notably the relaxation of Sino-U.S. tensions and moves toward new relationships in an area that has been dominated by the Indo-China conflict and the specter of "people's war." A statement issued by the Thai CP classical Maoist strategy of armed insurrection while reminding the Chinese that the Bangkok regime remains hostile to the common interests of the Asian communist movement. The Thai communists' Peking mentor, however, chose to balance its patronage of loyal client parties with its broader interests in Asian Affairs. Thus, following its dual-track approach to Southeast Asia, Peking failed to publicize its greeting message to the Thai CP while leaving it to the PRC-based clandestine "Voice of the People of Thailand" (VOPR) to broadcast the message.\* In revealing contrast, Hanoi issued not only a greetings message but also an editorial in the party organ stressing the message between the Vietnamese and Thai armed struggles against the United States and its local allies.

Messages reflecting their mutual ideological affinities were sent to the Thai CP by the fraternal Burmese and Malayan parties and broadcast by their respective PRC-based radios. From 6 to 12 December the VOPR carried fraternal greetings in the following order (giving pride of place to the CCP and other ruling parties): Chinese, North Vietnamese, Albanian, Korean, Romanian, Burmese, Malayan, and Philippine parties.

### THAI CP STATEMENT

The Thai Party marked its anniversary with party's central committee and a VOPR editorial on 1 December by the lighting the key points in the statement, particularly the necessity of armed struggle. The statement was three times longer than the comparable pronouncement marking the Party's 25th

\* See the Supplementary Article in the TRENDS of 22 November 1972 entitled "Peking and the Clandestine Radios Beamed to Southeast Asia."

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